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SURGING SECOND SEA FORCE
China’s Maritime Law-Enforcement Forces, Capabilities,  
and Future in the Gray Zone and Beyond
Andrew S. Erickson, Joshua Hickey, and Henry Holst
 China’s armed forces are divided into three major organizations, each of which has a maritime subcomponent� The gray-hulled People’s Liberation Army 
Navy (PLAN) claims a growing portion of the PLA’s personnel and resources; 
the People’s Armed Police (PAP) leads, and increasingly reflects the paramilitary 
character of, China’s white-hulled maritime law-enforcement (MLE) forces, in-
cluding the China Coast Guard (CCG); and the militia contains a growing propor-
tion of sea-based units, the blue-hulled, PLA-controlled People’s Armed Forces 
Maritime Militia (PAFMM)� Each of China’s three sea services is the world’s larg-
est in terms of ship numbers� Unlike America’s military-focused shipbuilding 
industry, China’s massive commercial shipbuilding industry subsidizes overhead 
costs for construction of all three sea forces’ vessels� That explains in part how 
China has been able to build and modernize all three services so expeditiously, 
none more rapidly than its second sea force, centered on the consolidating CCG� 
Using a platform-based approach that spans ongoing organizational changes, 
complexity, and overlap, this article assesses these vessels, their order of battle, 
and their capabilities, as well as likely future trends and implications�1
Over the past decade-plus, China has undertaken a massive MLE modern-
ization program that has increased greatly its capability to operate MLE vessels 
in remote areas� A key contributor to near-seas maritime operations to further 
disputed sovereignty claims in the “gray zone” between peace and war, these 
CCG-centered MLE forces afford Beijing increasing influence over the regional 
maritime situation without the direct use of PLAN warships, demonstrating 
power while reducing the risk of escalation and allowing the PLAN to focus on 
other, more “naval” missions farther afield�2
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This build-out has yielded Beijing a formidable “second navy�”3 Today China 
boasts not only the world’s largest navy but also the world’s largest maritime 
law-enforcement fleet—by a sizable margin� As of 2017, China’s 17,000-plus 
CCG personnel crewed 225 ships of over five hundred tons capable of operating 
offshore, and at least another 1,050 vessels confined to closer waters, for a total 
of over 1,275—more hulls than the coast guards of all its regional neighbors 
combined�4 At more than ten thousand tons full load each, its two Zhaotou-class 
patrol ships are the world’s largest MLE ships�
China is applying lessons learned from the U�S� and Japanese coast guards as 
well as indigenous experience, including the incorporation of new ship features 
such as helicopters, interceptor boats, deck guns, and high-capacity water can-
non� Most recently constructed CCG ships now have high-output water cannon 
mounted high on their superstructures� The 2014 Haiyang Shiyou (HYSY) 981 oil 
rig standoff demonstrated their ability to inflict damage by breaking pilothouse 
windows, damaging bridge-mounted equipment, forcing water down exhaust 
funnels, and breaking bones of crewmembers on Vietnamese vessels� Many new 
CCG ships have quick-launch boat ramps astern, allowing for rapid deployment 
of interceptor boats�
China’s MLE buildup is slowing, but far from over; in 2020, China’s coast guard 
is expected to have 260 ships capable of operating offshore�5 Many are capable 
of operating anywhere in the world�6 Numbers of small craft are not expected 
to change significantly; we estimate that the CCG will continue to own at least 
another 1,050 smaller vessels confined to closer waters, for a total of more than 
1,300 hulls� From 2005 to 2020, this represents overall a fifteen-year net increase 
of four hundred total coast guard ships, among them 202 additional ships capable 
Type (tonnage) 2005 2010 2017 2020 15-Year Net Increase
Oceangoing patrol ships (2,500–10,000)  3  5  55  60  +57
Regional patrol ships (1,000–2,499)  25  30  70  80  +55
Regional patrol combatants (500–999)  30  65  100  120  +90
Subtotal: Ships that can operate offshore  58  100  225  260  +202 (+350%)
Coastal patrol craft (100–499)  350  400  450  450 +100 (approx�)
Inshore patrol boats / minor craft (<100)*  500+  500+  600+  600+ +100 (approx�)
Total: All China Coast Guard 900+ 1,000+ 1,275+ 1,300+ +400 (approx.)
TABLE 1
CHINA COAST GUARD FORCE LEVELS (2005–20)
Note:
* There are forty-ton interceptor boats stationed on at least one (probably all) of China’s offshore islands. With forward basing available in the South 
China Sea disputed areas, size is less relevant than it was previously.
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of operating offshore, representing 350 percent growth in that category� As table 
1 indicates, all types of CCG ships have increased in numbers, with the most 
significant force-level increases, proportionately, occurring in oceangoing patrol 
ships (those over 2,500 tons)�
FOUNDATION
China’s MLE modernization program has proceeded in three major phases, the 
latter two of which overlap� Phase 1 (2000–10) focused on modest, dual-role 
research and patrol ships� These were relatively small (mostly 1,000–1,750 tons, 
with several larger ships) and generally unarmed� Only a few had helicopter fa-
cilities� Phase 2 (2010–17) yielded dozens of new purpose-built offshore patrol 
ships� Much larger than phase 1 vessels (three thousand to ten thousand tons full 
load), these ships featured improved sea keeping and endurance, as well as more-
advanced (military-style) electronic systems� Internet photographs indicate that 
all CCG ships built within the last five years have a datalink antenna (such as the 
HN-900), similar to those on PLAN vessels and to the U�S� Navy’s Link 11; older 
CCG ships now are being retrofitted with such antennae� Most vessels have he-
licopter decks, some with hangars� Some ships have high-pressure water cannon 
and ten-meter-long fast-interceptor boats with twin outboard engines enabling 
a thirty-five-knot top speed, well suited for dispatch to land features for local se-
curity operations� Most new ships built in phase 2 have 30 to 76 mm guns� Phase 
3 (2014–18) backfilled with coastal law-enforcement units, primarily dozens of 
modern, capable, fast patrol combatants with guns, oriented toward traditional 
law-enforcement functions� Several medium-sized patrol ships were built to pro-
vide command and control�
In 2013, China consolidated four of its five major maritime law-enforcement 
agencies (the “five dragons”) into a new agency called the CCG� The four dragons 
thus consolidated are the former State Oceanic Administration (SOA) and its 
subordinate China Marine Surveillance (CMS); the former Maritime Police and 
Border Control, previously administered by the Ministry of Public Security; the 
former Fisheries Law Enforcement (FLE), previously administered by the Min-
istry of Agriculture; and the former Maritime Anti-smuggling Police, previously 
administered by the General Administration of Customs (GAC)� Only one major 
MLE agency remains independent of the CCG: the Maritime Safety Administra-
tion (MSA)� Another non-CCG organization, China Rescue and Salvage (CRS), 
plays a supporting non-MLE role� The latter two will be discussed briefly just 
before the conclusion of the article�
More than twenty naval and commercial shipyards have produced CCG ves-
sels over the past decade� With overhead costs reduced by a strong commercial 
shipbuilding industry, construction of coast guard and other MLE vessels is both 
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cheap and efficient� Use of commercial, off-the-shelf drivetrains and electronics, 
combined with a lack of complex combat systems, facilitates rapid assembly, with 
multiple units built simultaneously� According to contract and media details, 
typical total construction time (from start to commissioning) is twelve to eigh-
teen months for a large (over one thousand tons) patrol ship (designated WPS) 
and nine to twelve months for a smaller (under one thousand tons) patrol craft 
(WPC) or patrol combatant (WPG)�
By 1999, China had made a national-level decision to start expanding and 
modernizing its MLE agencies�7 The majority of the shipbuilding budget was 
allocated to the organization 
then known as CMS, primar-
ily responsible for enforcing 
Chinese maritime territorial 
claims and conducting off-
shore law enforcement�8 Prior 
to the turn of the century, the 
CMS force consisted primar-
ily of a limited number of 
1970s-built dual-use patrol 
and research ships, most of which were relatively small and intended for opera-
tions in near-coastal areas� None of these ships was configured specifically for 
law-enforcement duties, as no guns, helicopters, fast-interceptor boats, water 
cannon, or other MLE equipment was fitted�9
Initially, the CMS ship-modernization program focused on the acquisition of 
dual-use ships of several sizes that could perform patrol and surveillance duties, 
as well as limited research and survey activities� This initial acquisition program 
began in earnest in 2004, with most new ships launched and commissioned 
by the end of 2005� CMS received three Shuyou-class “1,000-ton” patrol ships 
(1,428 tons full load), three Shuwu-class “1,500-ton” patrol ships (1,740 tons 
full load), and the first Shucha I “3,000-ton” patrol ship (4,000 tons full load), 
which were distributed relatively evenly among the three CMS branches (North, 
East, and South)� Typical of earlier dual-use patrol ships (known colloquially as 
“WAGORs”), all three classes were fitted with stern A-frames and cranes to 
enable them to handle hydrographic and oceanographic research equipment, 
although few ever have been seen performing such roles�10 Significantly, the 
Shucha I class was fitted with a helicopter landing deck and hangar facilities—
not previously fitted to any CMS ships—giving the first indication that CMS 
intended to perform offshore missions requiring helicopter support� However, in 
keeping with the missions of SOA and CMS—stated publicly as being primarily 
Unlike America’s military-focused shipbuild-
ing industry, China’s massive commercial ship-
building industry subsidizes overhead costs for 
construction of all three sea forces’ vessels. . . . 
China has been able to build and modernize 
all three . . . expeditiously, none more rap-
idly than . . . the consolidating China Coast 
Guard.
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scientific—none of these new ships was armed with any permanent weapons�11 
Central to the CMS ship buildup was the thirty-six-hull program that began in 
2010� Supplied to provincial and municipal MLE organizations, these ships dis-
placed six hundred to 1,500 tons�
China’s other maritime law-enforcement agencies, which historically only had 
limited offshore roles and capabilities, began to acquire a small number of ships 
capable of operating offshore� By 2007, the PAP Maritime Police acquired its first 
large patrol ship, the Haixun II class’s solitary vessel, Zhong Guo Hai Jing 1001 
(now known as Hai Jing 31101). Historically, the PAP Maritime Police had oper-
ated only small, fast, heavily armed patrol craft in support of its primary respon-
sibilities of border defense, antismuggling efforts, and immigration enforcement 
(as well as regime security)� Hai Jing 31101 was equipped with a 37 mm main gun 
and a helicopter deck� It had more than four times the displacement of most PAP 
Maritime Police patrol craft, and its restricted initial operations revealed the PAP 
Maritime Police’s discomfort with operating larger ships; most PAP Maritime 
Police patrol craft crewmen were drawn from land-based defense forces rather 
than maritime backgrounds� The PAP thus had difficulty adapting to the twenty-
four-hour cycle of activity that is required when a ship goes out for days or weeks 
at a time; this was not part of its organizational culture�12 For most of its early 
career, Hai Jing 31101 rarely ventured beyond coastal waters� It was seen largely 
as a ceremonial “status” platform for the PAP Maritime Police, although in recent 
years under the CCG it has played a slightly more active offshore role�
The Bureau of Fisheries oversaw China Fisheries Law Enforcement, which 
already operated several dozen aging offshore patrol ships used for resource 
protection and fisheries enforcement� FLE began its own modest moderniza-
tion program in the first few years of the new century� This consisted mostly of 
introducing new coastal patrol craft classes, but culminated in the construction 
of the then-impressive Zhongyang-class patrol ship Zhong Guo Yu Zheng 310, 
which was launched in 2010�13 As with other MLE agencies’ recent acquisitions, 
FLE chose to equip WPS 310 with a helicopter deck and hangar—even though 
FLE did not actually own any helicopters� In its initial years, FLE used WPS 310 
extensively for offshore patrol duties, and in later years the ship would serve as 
a proof of concept for at least one follow-on class that now forms the backbone 
of the FLE fleet�
Early in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the fourth major maritime 
law-enforcement agency, GAC, had just finished building over thirty new two-
hundred-ton patrol craft (of the Hailin I and II classes) for coastal countersmug-
gling operations� It did not have a significant ship-construction program ongoing 
after about 2003�
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MSA continued its own construction program, acquiring a variety of ships 
to fulfill its specialized missions, ranging across buoy tending, environmental 
cleanup, search and rescue, light maritime towing and salvage, and port opera-
tions� MSA also acquired several large patrol ships that were able to respond to 
offshore maritime disasters and emergencies and interact with major coast guard 
organizations from other Pacific countries� MSA was the first of the five dragons 
to obtain purpose-built patrol ships large enough for transoceanic operations, 
with the two Shubian-class ships attending joint exercises in Hawaii and other 
distant locales� Unlike China’s other MLE agencies, MSA consistently has main-
tained a close working relationship with the U�S� Coast Guard, the Japan Coast 
Guard, and other regional MLE organizations�14 Unlike the other dragons, MSA 
historically has acquired a large portion of its funding from collection of port 
fees from commercial shipping, allowing it some degree of budget autonomy and 
insulation from the country’s leadership and national budget issues�15
MOVING FORWARD: CHINA’S NEW COAST GUARD
As previously noted, 2013 saw the integration (at least on paper) of four of these 
agencies into a new agency called the China Coast Guard� This reform had been 
anticipated for several years by the individual agencies, several of which appar-
ently began aggressive construction programs after 2010, perhaps in an attempt 
to assert dominance within the new organization’s command structure�16 There 
was little cooperation, with each organization (particularly FLE and CMS) appar-
ently focusing on its own ship designs�
Shortly before CCG integration, the CMS force also acquired several auxiliary 
ships that recently had been retired from PLAN service� These transfers likely 
were intended to fill gaps in patrol capabilities as China began to pursue maritime 
expansion more assertively in the South and East China Seas� The vessels in-
cluded three former intelligence-collection ships (the icebreaking Yanbing-class 
former AGI 723, the Xiang Yang Hong 9–class former AGI 852, and the Haiyang-
class former AGI 411), as well as a few other old PLAN auxiliaries, including a 
converted cable layer, a minelayer, and three large ocean salvage tugs� The former 
PLAN ships were pressed into service immediately (largely without naval guns 
and electronics), while the ship-construction program of CMS—a leading com-
ponent of the soon-to-be CCG—proceeded�17
One hallmark of CCG modernization in recent years has been the clear spe-
cialization of ships and craft toward particular missions, an outcome of procure-
ment programs initiated in the era of the five dragons�18 Moreover, China’s mas-
sive shipbuilding industry (and, presumably, shipbuilding budget) has allowed 
the CCG to focus on a variety of designs oriented toward specific requirements, 
rather than building jack-of-all-trades ships that were more flexible but less 
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capable of specific functions� However, all these ships and craft remain highly ca-
pable of acting in other roles, particularly those related to promoting sovereignty 
in disputed South and East China Sea areas�
A second hallmark of CCG modernization is a preference for evolutionary 
design modifications� Since 2010, various initial designs have been followed by 
frequent revisions in configurations and capabilities� For instance, China has 
made four sequential variations of its “regional thousand-ton” patrol-ship design 
since the program started almost a decade ago� The original variant (the Shuyou 
class) was essentially a dual-purpose research and patrol ship for CMS� It was 
equipped with A-frames and cranes at the fantail to accommodate survey activi-
ties� As the design progressed to the Shuke I, II, and III classes, the ships clearly 
evolved toward a law-enforcement role, with cranes and A-frames removed; da-
vits for small, fast boats added; and hull and superstructure modifications made 
to allow them to handle open-water operations better�
Similar upgrades have been made in other classes� These changes were both a 
result of close observation of other modern MLE ships (primarily those operated 
by the U�S� Coast Guard and Japan Coast Guard) and lessons learned by CMS, 
FLE, and other CCG agency ships operating farther offshore for longer periods�
MARITIME CUSTOMS AND ANTISMUGGLING
The segment of the CCG that performs maritime customs enforcement (for-
merly GAC) has been active in acquisitions in recent years, replacing most of 
its 1980s/1990s-built fleet of small patrol craft with three new classes of ships 
intended specifically for maritime law-enforcement and customs duties� The new 
Zhaogao-class patrol ship, of which three were built, gives the CCG additional ca-
pability for exclusive economic zone (EEZ) patrol activities, such as intercepting 
smugglers farther offshore� The 1,750-ton ship is 308 feet long and thirty-nine 
feet in beam� Unlike most CCG patrol ships, which have maximum speeds of just 
over twenty knots, the Zhaogao design has four powerful diesel engines that like-
ly allow it to reach top speeds of nearly thirty knots, with a range of five thousand 
nautical miles (nm) at fifteen knots�19 These ships also are equipped with two 
quick-launch davits for fast-interceptor boats that can be deployed while under 
way� The ships are fitted with a 30 mm automatic main gun and a helicopter deck�
A second specialty class, the Hutao I patrol combatant, is configured for 
extended patrols deep into China’s EEZ� Like the Zhaogao, the Hutao I is fitted 
with four diesels providing a full-power speed of over thirty knots via four shafts 
and propellers, and a range of five thousand nautical miles at fifteen knots� The 
625-ton Hutao I measures 223 feet long and 28�5 feet in beam� It has dual quick-
launch stern ramps, allowing it to launch and recover fast-interceptor boats while 
under way, and is armed with a single 30 mm gun, two smaller guns, and water 
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cannon� At least eight Hutao Is are operational already, and additional units con-
tinue to be built�
A third class, the Hulai II, is cosmetically similar to the ubiquitous Dutch Da-
men Stan Patrol 4207, a patrol craft operated by over a dozen navies and coast 
guards internationally� However, the Hulai II adds a third engine, once again 
giving it a top speed of over thirty knots, for missions inside China’s EEZ, particu-
larly maritime customs interdiction, and a range of 1,200 nm at eighteen knots� 
The 330-ton Hulai II is 177 feet long and twenty-four feet in beam, and also is 









 3 (Hai Jing) 33103 (Zhejiang), 
44104 (Guangdong), 46014 
(Hainan)
308 1,750  30
Hutao I 
WPG
8 (3+ new units) (Hai Jing) 31101, 31103, 
33104, 35104, 44105, 44106, 
45103 + more
223  625  30
Hutao 
III WPG
 2 44109, 44110 223  625  30
Haihei  
WPC
 2 (Hai Guan) 905 + another 205  450  37
Haifeng 
WPC
 5 (Hai Guan) 900–904 190  440 14�5
Hulai II 
WPC
15 (+ new units) (Hai Jing) 33004, 35007, 
37001, 44005, 44008, 44015–
18, 44020, 44021, 45001, 
45002, 46003 + more
177  330 14�5
Hailin I 
WPC
 25+ (Hai Jing) 44059, 44068, 
44069; (Hai Guan) 853–80 
(pennant numbers probably 
changed)




 10+ (Hai Jing) 21091, 31088, 
33086, 35089; (Hai Guan) 
881–90 (pennant numbers 
probably changed)
170  230  23
Type 611 
WPC
~10 (Hai Jing) 33028; (Hai Guan) 
823–30 (pennant numbers 
probably changed)
145  170 14�5
Haigao  
WPC
 10+ (Hai Guan) 810–20 (pennant 
numbers probably changed)
140  100 14�5
Notes:
WPC = coast guard patrol craft; WPG = coast guard patrol gunboat; WPS = coast guard patrol ship. 
The China Coast Guard overall has several hundred classes of ships; to keep this and subsequent tables manageable, only the most significant classes 
are included.
TABLE 2
CHINA COAST GUARD MARITIME CUSTOMS: NOTABLE CLASSES
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equipped with a fast-launch stern-ramp system, allowing it to deploy its intercep-
tor boat while under way� It has small arms and a smoke grenade launcher, high-
capacity water cannon, and reinforced hull rub rails� In recent years, variations 
of both the Hutao I and the Hulai II designs have been sold to export customers 
(the latter to Pakistan), indicating that these are competitive, effective designs in 
a crowded international patrol craft market� Over a dozen Hulai IIs have been 
built in the last few years, and as many as thirty total units may be built to replace 
the CCG’s older Type 611– and Hailin I/II–class patrol craft built in the 1980s 
and ’90s�20
LONG-RANGE FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT
Fisheries enforcement and other resource protection in furtherance of China’s 
territorial claims always has been a primary mission of China’s maritime agen-
cies, specifically the former FLE� FLE’s progressive integration into the CCG 
likely improved the budgetary situation for the former, which to execute its 
mission historically had relied on a jumble of older, less-capable patrol ships, a 
hodgepodge of patrol craft, and assorted converted fishing boats� Over the past 
decade the CCG’s former Fisheries Enforcement Branch embarked on an active 
program to replace and modernize its entire fleet�
Most notable with regard to long-distance fisheries enforcement is the new 
Zhaoyu-class large patrol ship, of which a dozen were commissioned from 2014 
to 2016� At 360 feet long and forty-six feet in beam, the 3,500-ton Zhaoyus have 
a traditional combatant-style hull optimized for long-distance cruising in heavy 
seas, as these ships are intended for operations well outside China’s disputed 
maritime periphery—in theory, anywhere�21 This class has an estimated top speed 
of twenty-five knots, with a range of 7,500 nm at fourteen knots� Design modi-
fications were based on lessons learned from FLE’s former flagship, the one-off 
Zhongyang-class patrol ship Zhong Guo Yu Zheng 310, which recently was trans-
ferred to the Sansha City municipality� FLE likely identified some design and 
stability flaws in the ship, and subsequently improved the Zhaoyu configuration 
by reducing the superstructure by one deck (for roll stability) and adding a stern-
launch boat ramp to deploy interceptor and boarding craft from beneath the 
helicopter deck� Additional fittings include a helicopter hangar and a substantial 
armament of one single 30 mm gun and four single automatic 12�7 mm guns�22
New to this category is the Zhaochang patrol ship, purpose-built for long-
distance fisheries enforcement with a new tumblehome hull design and a 30 mm 
gun�23 The 3,500-ton ship is 360 feet long and forty-nine feet in beam� A proof 
of concept for the CCG’s first ship with electric-drive propulsion, complete with 
diesel generators, the sole Zhaochang built to date yields a top speed of only 
twenty knots, but has a long range: ten thousand nautical miles at fifteen knots�
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Zhaochang WPS  1 (Hai Jing) 2301 360  3,500  30
Zhaoyu WPS  12 (Hai Jing) 1301–1304, 2302–
2304, 3301–3305, 46305
360  3,500  30
Zhaotim WPS 14–15 (Hai Jing) 1102–1104, 
3104–3106, 21115, 31115, 
33115, 35115, 37115, 46115; (Yu 
Zheng) 45005, 45013, 45036
269  1,764  30
Dalang I WPS 
(ex-PLAN)
 1 (Hai Jing) 3411 370  4,500  30
Zhongeng WPS 10+ (Yu Zheng) 13001, 32501, 
33001, 33006, 35001, 37008, 
44061, 45001, 46012 + more
180 ~1,000 14�5
Zhongwen WPS  1 (Yu Zheng) 21103 195  850 unknown
Zhongke WPG  6+ (Yu Zheng) 21101, 21111, 
27061, 33018, 33205, 45002 + 
possibly more
180  ~500 unknown
Zhongem WPG  2 (Yu Zheng) 37361 190  550 14�5
Zhongtao WPC 50+ (Yu Zheng) 12002, 21006, 
21009, 21137, 21202, 21401, 
32511, 32521, 32528, 32543, 
32545, 33012, 33015–19, 33023, 
33025, 33129, 33316, 33416, 
33417, 37001, 37005, 37015, 
37529, 37601, 45012, 46013 + 
more
160–70 300–450 14�5
Zhongsui WPC  6 (Yu Zheng) 35199, 44601–603, 
44606, 45003
165  ~350 14�5
Duancude WPC 10+ (Yu Zheng) 21402, 31006, 
37057, 37206, 37518 + more
130  ~200 none
Nanhua Type A 
WPC
 ~10 (Yu Zheng) 44025, 44081, 
44121, 44168; (Hai Jian) 9040, 
9060 (additional units operated 
by China MSA and PLA MTS)
110  150  23
Zhongbong 
WPC
10+ (Yu Zheng) 13203, 13301, 
32511, 37078, 37163, 37606, 
37607 
100–20  ~150 none
Fisheries patrol 
trawlers
30+ (Yu Zheng) variety of designs 
and numbers
100–20 250–600 none,  
generally
Red Arrow WPB 50+ 4-digit, ending in H 40  15 none
TABLE 3
CHINA COAST GUARD FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT ORDER OF BATTLE (SELECTED)
Notes:
MSA = Maritime Safety Administration; MTS = Maritime Transport Squadron (Army Logistics); PLA = People’s Liberation Army; PLAN = People’s Libera-
tion Army Navy; WPB = coast guard patrol boat; WPC = coast guard patrol craft; WPG = coast guard patrol gunboat; WPS = coast guard patrol ship.
The six classes at the bottom of the table (beginning with the Zhongsui WPC), while relatively small in tonnage, are deployable to Chinese-occupied 
features in the South China Sea, and may well be used thus.
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For regional fisheries-enforcement operations—particularly in disputed 
fisheries areas adjacent to Vietnam (e�g�, the Gulf of Tonkin), Japan, and the 
Koreas—the CCG built a large class of smaller patrol ships, the Zhaotim class� 
The fourteen or fifteen 269-foot-long, thirty-nine-foot-beam, 1,764-ton ships in 
this class are optimized for regional, medium-endurance patrols, with a reported 
7,500-mile range at thirteen knots, an ice-strengthened hull (for operations in the 
northern Bo Hai [formerly known as the Gulf of Chihli]), a 30 mm gun, two small 
fast-interceptor boats, and a moderate towing capability to assist disabled fishing 
boats� With their regional, near-shore focus, Zhaotims lack helicopter facilities� 
The relatively beamy, low-slung hull design, with bulbous bow, indicates that sea 
keeping in heavy weather and efficiency were key design factors, rather than the 
high speed and maneuverability prioritized in other CCG ships intended for in-
terdiction duties� (Fishing boats, typically low speed, cannot outrun even patrol 
ships whose top speed does not exceed twenty knots, such as the Zhaotim class�)
Provincial-level fisheries law-enforcement agencies also have undertaken a 
major modernization program� As late as the 1990s, PRC coastal fisheries en-
forcement predominantly was performed by converted fishing boats and vari-
ous older patrol craft� However, in the last decade local forces have built about 
a dozen different designs of thirty-five-to-sixty-meter coastal patrol craft and 
combatants for more-local, short-endurance enforcement duties� Most notably, 
the fifty-meter, 450-ton Zhongtao class has been in constant production since 
the early years of this century, with over fifty units built at six shipyards to date�
All units share a common hull and basic superstructure design, but vary sig-
nificantly in how they are fitted out topside, depending on operational location 
and typical weather conditions� For operational areas where assertive fishermen 
may use collisions and shouldering as a defense against enforcement (e�g�, the 
Gulf of Tonkin), Zhongtao units have reinforced ribbing along the hulls� For op-
erational areas with heavier sea conditions (e�g�, the East China Sea), Zhongtao 
units may have raised bow bulwarks� Some units stationed in the Yellow Sea and 
Bo Hai may have ice-strengthened bows� Earlier units used small, davit-launched 
interceptor boats, while later units have a stern gate and quick-launch ramp� The 
Zhongtao class is yet another example of coast guard designers adapting and 
learning operational lessons when building new ships and patrol craft�
OFFSHORE SURVEILLANCE, PATROL, AND  
SOVEREIGNTY ENFORCEMENT
While the CCG in its entirety has a general role of performing offshore surveil-
lance and patrol (particularly with its larger patrol ships), as well as border de-
fense and territorial enforcement, historically these roles were played primarily 
by two former dragons: CMS and the PAP Maritime Police� CMS was primarily 
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responsible for offshore duties, with much of its force composed of larger ships 
capable of longer-endurance operations and dual hatted as oceanographic re-
search ships�
As a component of the well-funded SOA, CMS substantially bolstered its new 
shipbuilding programs during and after the consolidation with orders for several 
new classes of large ships (most of which eventually were commissioned into the 
now-consolidated CCG)� New CMS ships clearly were built with a primary role 
of open-seas, long-term patrol and surveillance duties, and were less equipped for 
law-enforcement interception, fisheries administration, oceanographic research, 
or safety of life at sea (SOLAS) 
roles than CCG ships built 
prior to 2012�24
The most notable of the 
new ships built for the CCG 
in recent years were the two 
massive Zhaotou-class flag-
ships, one each based in the south and the east� The Zhaotous have received an 
inordinate amount of media attention owing to their great size: with a length of 
165 meters (541 feet), a beam of more than twenty meters (over sixty-five feet), 
and a full load of more than ten thousand tons, their displacement is greater than 
that of modern naval destroyers� Their estimated speed is twenty-five knots, their 
range 15,000 nm�
However, the substantive rationale for construction of these ships is unclear, 
as they do not offer any technical advantages vis-à-vis other, smaller, patrol ships 
built recently for the CCG�25 There are Internet rumors that the ships were or-
dered in direct response to Japan’s deployment of its 9,500-ton Shikishima-class 
cutters to the Senkakus in 2013, which at the time dwarfed any ships in the CCG 
inventory, suggesting that construction of the Zhaotou class represents a point 
of pride for China—to have the world’s largest coast guard ships—rather than 
an actual capability requirement� While that rationale is speculative at best, the 
Zhaotou design nonetheless does provide the CCG with a large platform that can 
operate anywhere in the world with maximum endurance, while carrying a heli-
copter and mounting a 76 mm main gun� It is unlikely that any additional units 
of this class will be built, however, owing to the ship’s berthing requirements and 
the presumably higher cost of operations without any tangible benefit in capabil-
ity compared with smaller CCG patrol ships�26
Since consolidation, the CCG’s three most effective new classes of large patrol 
ships have been the Shucha II, Shuoshi II, and Zhaolai classes, all of which are 
based on earlier classes that were operational before the CCG reform� The Shucha 
II, of which ten units are currently operational, is based on the Shucha I design 
CCG-centered MLE forces afford Beijing in-
creasing influence over the regional maritime 
situation without the direct use of PLAN war-
ships, demonstrating power while reducing the 
risk of escalation.
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originally built for CMS early in the new century� When built, the Shucha I was 
the most modern ship in the CMS inventory, combining long-distance endur-
ance with a substantial ability to perform oceanographic research� The Shucha II 
improved on this design and oriented the mission strictly toward patrol activities 
by eliminating the survey handling equipment and stern A-frame, replacing them 
with a larger helicopter deck and launch facilities for small interceptor boats� The 
Shucha II, like its predecessor, is equipped with a hybrid diesel-electric power 
plant—providing good cruising efficiency and range—and a drivetrain that uses 
steerable electric propulsor pods—giving it excellent maneuverability� Moreover, 
Shucha II has positions available for installation of 30 mm main guns in the fu-
ture, if required�27
Arguably comprising the most capable and versatile class in the CCG, the four 
Shuoshi II–class units are based on MSA’s flagship Hai Xun 01, built several years 
earlier� With a length of 130 m and beam of 16 m (fifty-two feet) and a 5,800-ton 
displacement, it is similar in overall size and design to the U�S� Coast Guard’s 
Legend-class National Security Cutter� The Shuoshi II design is configured for 
long-distance open-ocean operations in any weather conditions� It is fitted with 
high-capacity water cannon and a helicopter landing deck and hangar, and has 
design provisions for the future fitting of a 76 mm gun� However, unlike that of 
many other large, purpose-built patrol ships the CCG operates, a Shuoshi II’s 
aft area is considered a “working stern,” capable of performing light rescue and 
salvage operations and moderate towing of ships at sea, giving this class a well-
rounded capability that is not limited to law-enforcement operations� While it 
remains unclear whether additional hulls will be built, this is one of the world’s 
most capable, versatile MLE vessels�28
The Zhaolai-class patrol ship likely was an off-the-shelf design intended to 
provide the capability quickly to interact with Japanese and Vietnamese vessels in 
the Senkakus and the South China Sea� The Zhaolai is based closely on the CRS 
Hai Jiu 111–class salvage and rescue ship, giving it a heavy-duty hull, a powerful 
engineering plant, and the ability to operate in even the worst sea and weather 
conditions� The 4,800-ton Zhaolai design eliminated the large salvage cranes 
present on the CRS variant and added davits for small interceptor boats� Each of 
the CCG’s four Zhaolais also is equipped with a helicopter landing deck and has 
a mount position forward for a 76 mm gun, should the CCG desire to backfit the 
ship with one� Among CCG ships, the Zhaolai is configured best for heavy towing 
and shouldering of other ships, and its large, high-mounted water cannon can be 
used both for firefighting and for dousing smaller foreign ships during close-in, 
nonkinetic dissuasion operations� As the Zhaolai was initially an off-the-shelf 
stopgap solution to CCG capability shortfalls and is inferior to more-specialized 
designs, it is unlikely that additional units will be built�29
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Zhaotou WPS  2 (Hai Jing) 2901, 3901 541 10,000+ 76, 30
Zhaoduan WPS  6 (Hai Jing) 31301–303, 46301–303 450  4,000+ 76
Zhaojun WPS  9 21111, 33111, 35111, 37111, 44111, 45111, 46111–13 328  2,700 76
Shuoshi II WPS  4 (Hai Jing) 1501, 2501, 2502, 3501 426  5,800 76 (prov�)
Zhaolai WPS  4 (Hai Jing) 1401, 2401, 3401, 3402 325  4,800 76 (prov�)
Shucha II WPS  10 (Hai Jing) 1305–307, 2305–308, 
3306–308 321  4,000 30
Hai Yang WPS  
(ex-PLAN)
 1 (Hai Jing) 3368 345  3,325 none
Kanjie WPS  
(ex-PLAN)
 1 (Hai Jing) 2506 425  5,830 removed
Type 053 
Jiangwei I WFF 
(ex-PLAN)
 3 (Hai Jing) 31239 [former PLAN 
FF 539], 31240 [former PLAN FF 
540], 31241 [former PLAN FF 541]
367  2,000 37
Shusheng WPS  5 (Hai Jian) 1010, 2115, 3015, 7008, 
9010
290  1,750 14�5 (prov�)
Shuke I/II/III 
WPS
20 I: (Hai Jing) 1127
II: (Hai Jing) 1123, 1126, 2166, 
3175
III: (Hai Jing) 2112, 2113, 3111– 
13; (Hai Jian) 1002, 1013, 2032, 
2168, 4001, 4002, 4072; (Yu Zheng) 
46016 
245–65  1,450 none
Shuyou WPS  3 (Hai Jing) 1117, 2146, 3171 242  1,000 none
Shuwu WPS  3 (Hai Jing) 1115, 2151, 3184 288  1,750 none
Tuzhong WPS  
(ex-PLAN)
 3 (Hai Jing) 1310, 2337, 3367 278  3,300 none
Haixun II WPS  1 (Hai Jing) 31101 311  1,900 37, 23
Haijian 
WAGOR/WPS
 4 (Hai Jian) 1118, 2149, 3172, 3174 230  1,350 none
Shuzao II/III 
WPG
 15 II: (Hai Jian) 9012
III: (Hai Jian) 1015, 1116, 1117, 
2030, 3011, 3012, 4067, 4073, 5030, 
7018, 7028, 7038, 8003, 8027
215 600 12�7
TABLE 4
CHINA COAST GUARD OFFSHORE SURVEILLANCE, PATROL, AND SOVEREIGNTY- 
ENFORCEMENT ORDER OF BATTLE (SELECTED)
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Meanwhile, the PAP Maritime Police was primarily a coastal and riverine force 
not known for its members’ seamanship skills, as most of its personnel origi-
nated in ground-based PAP units�30 The CCG currently is building a significant 
number of patrol ships from two new, highly capable classes that apparently were 
ordered before CCG consolidation by the then PAP Maritime Police (i�e�, the old 
coast guard)� The larger of these classes, the Zhaoduan (Type 818), is the CCG’s 
newest and fastest class under construction� It is based directly on the PLAN’s 
Jiangkai II (Type 054)–class guided-missile frigate, using an almost identical 
hull and likely the same powerful 2+2 combined diesel and diesel (referred to as 
“CODAD”) power plant� This naval design has proved highly reliable in PLAN 
antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden� The overall configuration of the Zhao-
duan is similar to the Jiangkai II above the main deck as well, but with an ad-
ditional superstructure deck added and some other topside changes� The Zhao-
duan lacks the powerful combat systems of the Jiangkai II, eliminating the HQ-16 
vertical-launch surface-to-air missile system, close-in-weapon systems, and long-
range military electronics�31 However, the Zhaoduan does retain the same 76 mm 
main gun as the Jiangkai II� Together with two 30 mm guns, this makes it the 
CCG’s most heavily armed ship� Its helicopter landing area and hangar accom-
modate Z-9, AW109, or EC135 helicopters� With the propulsion system from the 
Jiangkai II but a reduced displacement of something over four thousand tons, the 
Zhao duan likely can attain a top speed of over thirty knots, making it one of the 
world’s fastest large coast guard ships, with a ten-thousand-nautical-mile range 
at fifteen knots� These qualities will make the Zhaoduan a go-to workhorse for 
the CCG� Six units of this class have been launched to date, and additional units 
have been ordered, according to some media sources�32
The CCG also is building the smaller Zhaojun (Type 718)–class cutter, using 












30+ (Hai Jing) 015,* 12001, 13101, 
13102, 21101–104, 31102, 32102, 
33101, 33102, 35101–103, 37101, 
37102, 44101, 44103, 45101, 45102, 
46101, 46102, 46105, 46106 + 
more
201–208 650 25 or 30
CHINA COAST GUARD OFFSHORE SURVEILLANCE, PATROL, AND SOVEREIGNTY- 
ENFORCEMENT ORDER OF BATTLE (SELECTED) CONTINUED
Notes:
PLAN = People’s Liberation Army Navy; prov. = provisional (i.e., collar fitted but no gun mounted); WAGOR = oceanographic research ship; WFF = coast 
guard frigate; WPS = coast guard patrol ship.
* This is a training vessel subordinate to the Maritime Police Academy, but is nonetheless fully combat capable.
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long and forty-three feet in beam� Its estimated maximum speed is twenty-five 
knots, its range 6,500 nm� At least nine of these patrol ships have been launched 
to date, with several already operational, and additional units are possible� The 
Zhaojun has a helicopter deck and a small interceptor boat–launch facility� Like 
the Zhaoduan, it is fitted with a 76 mm main gun forward�33
Capable of operating offshore for regional security missions, Type 618B-II pa-
trol combatants performed with distinction in the 2014 HYSY 981 oil rig stand-
off� They displace 650 tons, 
are up to 208 feet long and 
thirty feet in beam, and have 
a large power plant capable of 
around thirty knots top speed 
and a two-thousand-nautical-
mile range� They are also very 
maneuverable� The CCG’s more than twenty-five hulls of this type each have a 
25 mm or 30 mm main gun and high-capacity water cannon� Some units have a 
fast-boat launch ramp at the stern�
Aside from these purpose-built border-defense ships and craft, the CCG has 
accepted three former PLAN Jiangwei I patrol frigates� Their missiles and most 
naval systems have been removed, but each retains twin 37 mm guns and a heli-
copter hangar� These ships are only two thousand tons in displacement, 367 feet 
in length, and 40�7 feet in beam; their strength is a top speed of around thirty 
knots and a range of 4,500 nm at eighteen knots�
FACILITIES
In recent years, copious open-source information has indicated that China is 
consolidating its myriad MLE facilities into a smaller number of larger bases with 
substantial berthing capacity and other shoreside infrastructure� Although the 
precise number of CCG maritime facilities in China is difficult to determine, the 
service is thought to have over two hundred total facilities at which ships or small 
craft are stationed�34 However, fewer than forty of these are regarded as large 
bases that can accommodate offshore-capable patrol ships� The rest provide bas-
ing for coastal or local patrol craft and patrol boats� Many of these smaller bases 
are collocated with or near fishing harbors, and are home to FLE patrol craft that 
require limited shoreside infrastructure� Many other facilities host even smaller 
inshore patrol boats, and essentially are just a small pier or jetty with a single 
support building, if that�35
In recent years, the most substantial CCG bases have been expanded signifi-
cantly, with much larger piers to accommodate all the new ships and substantial 
shoreside capacities, including barracks, athletic facilities, and, in some cases, 
Today China boasts not only the world’s larg-
est navy but also the world’s largest maritime 
law-enforcement fleet—by a sizable margin  
. . . —more hulls than the coast guards of all 
its regional neighbors combined.
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Location Province or Equivalent Coordinates  (approx. latitude/longitude)
Beihai Guangxi 21�485, 109�084
Fangchenggang Shiping Guangxi 21�626, 108�316
Qinzhou Guangxi 21�736, 108�639
Jinzhou Liaoning 40�846, 121�103
Fuzhou Guling Fujian 26�055, 119�353
Fuzhou Tingjiang Fujian 26�074, 119�513
Xiamen downtown Fujian 24�467, 118�065
Xiamen China Coast Guard (CCG)
base
Fujian 24�511, 118�065
Dalian Mianhuadao Shandong 39�006, 121�675
Dalian Wantong Shandong 39�010, 121�709
Yantai Yangma Dao Shandong 37�444, 121�582
Yantai Zhifu Bay Shandong 37�545, 121�392
Tianjin port area Tianjin  38�985, 117�728 (vicinity)
Guangzhou Taihe Guangdong 23�109, 113�395
Huangpu Changzhou Guangdong 23�077, 113�432
Huangpu Luntou Guangdong 23�078, 113�375
Shantou Guangdong 23�353, 116�688
Zhanjiang Tiaoshun Guangdong 21�286, 110�409
Qinhuangdao fishing wharf Hebei 39�921, 119�617
Qinhuangdao coal terminal Hebei 39�935, 119�668
Shanghai Fuxing Dao Shanghai 31�288, 121�561
Shanghai Gaoqiao Shanghai 31�357, 121�614
Shanghai port facility Shanghai 31�384, 121�549
Nantong Jiangsu 31�908, 120�910
Haikou port Hainan 20�031, 110�278
Haikou Haidian River Hainan 20�025, 110�323
Sanya Hainan 18�233, 109�492
Wenchang Hainan 19�560, 110�825
Qingdao Tuandao Inlet Shandong 36�050, 120�298
TABLE 5
SELECTED MAJOR CHINA COAST GUARD FACILITIES
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limited ship-repair facilities� Growing emphasis on ship repair shows both an 
understanding of a maturing fleet’s operational needs and a desire to avoid being 
subordinated to the PLAN for access to maintenance� As part of these efforts, the 
CCG built its first floating dry dock� The dock can be moved to different locations, 
including South China Sea “features,” and can accommodate smaller patrol ships�
Although the CCG reform began in 2013, in most cases the service’s facilities 
remain somewhat segregated according to organizational mission; that is, bases 
that previously hosted FLE ships continue to host ships that perform fisheries-
enforcement activities� It is unclear whether duplicative facilities will be elimi-
nated in the future�36
CHINA MARITIME SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
MSA was not included in the 2013 CCG consolidation and remains an indepen-
dent agency with its own fleet and facilities� MSA is responsible for the control 
and securing of China’s maritime ports and commercial maritime traffic, for aids 
to navigation (buoys, lighthouses, etc�), for pollution control, and for SOLAS, 
among other missions� MSA’s presence largely is limited to China’s territorial 
waters, although the agency does have several large patrol ships that occasionally 
take long voyages for joint exercises with other nations’ coast guard forces or to 
participate in search-and-rescue operations (such as searching for the missing 
plane from Malaysia Airlines Flight 370)� However, the great majority of the MSA 
fleet is composed of hundreds of coastal patrol craft; thousands of inshore patrol 
boats; and a variety of specialized vessels used for buoy tending, hydrographic 
survey, pollution cleanup, and other utilitarian roles�37
MSA, while considered a law-enforcement agency, generally is not involved 
in territorial disputes (such as in the South China Sea or Senkakus), fisheries 
enforcement, customs, or other countercriminal activities� MSA maintains a 
good working relationship with regional forces, including the U�S� Coast Guard, 
Location Province or Equivalent Coordinates  (approx. latitude/longitude)
Qingdao port area Shandong 36�082, 120�309
Qingdao Huangdao Shandong 36�005, 120�272
Zhoushan Waichangzhi Zhejiang 29�980, 122�082
Ningbo CCG Academy Zhejiang 29�945, 121�710
Wenzhou Lucheng Zhejiang 28�025, 120�672
SELECTED MAJOR CHINA COAST GUARD FACILITIES CONTINUED
Source: Located via Google Earth.
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the Japan Coast Guard, and South Korea’s Korea Coast Guard, and often works 
jointly with these forces�38
CHINA RESCUE AND SALVAGE
CRS, while not a law-enforcement organization, nonetheless is a government- 
run agency under China’s Ministry of Transportation that has a substantial pres-
ence in China’s maritime realm� CRS operates both in an official capacity (in 
support of SOLAS) and in a commercial capacity, taking on contract work rang-
ing from towing stranded ships and salvaging sunken ships to transporting and 
placing commercial oil rigs�
Profits from this commercial side provide CRS with a substantial independent 
budget, much of which CRS spends on constant modernization of its impres-
sively large fleet of rescue, salvage, heavy-transport, semisubmersible, and large 
crane ships� The most visible CRS units are the thirty-plus modern rescue and 
salvage ships, which spend most of their time loitering in busy maritime traffic 
areas and roadsteads off Chinese ports�
CRS has several major bases, some of which are collocated with or near CCG 
or MSA facilities, but CRS generally does not operate with or interact heavily 
with CCG forces�39 While CRS’s large ships may be present in the vicinity of mari-
time disputes, they typically are there only to provide rescue in case of damage 
to other-agency (or foreign) ships and do not get involved in any enforcement or 
deterrence activities�
CRS is highly regarded in the international maritime community owing to 
its courageous, professional, and experienced personnel, strong rescue ethic, 
modern and highly capable fleet of ships, and lack of involvement in maritime 
disputes� CRS ships often are contracted to perform transport and other work 
around the globe�40
In building both the world’s largest coast guard and the largest overall MLE 
force, China has achieved an impressive increase in its maritime capabilities� It 
has leveraged massive capacity for building all sizes of patrol ships, cost relief 
from commercial construction profits, and domestic production of most systems 
(including engines and electronics) to field a formidable number and variety of 
ships specialized for different roles and operating areas� Enhanced CCG capacity 
is envisioned to allow the PLAN to focus on naval roles beyond the first island 
chain, with a commensurate reduction in PLAN small patrol craft over the past 
decade�41 Moreover, new CCG ships capable of long-distance operations in 
higher seas—the largest capable of operating globally—could permit extended 
deployments beyond maritime East Asia (e�g�, to conduct antipiracy patrols or 
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perform escort duties along sea lines of communication)� CCG modernization 
and expansion afford China presence and influence to further its East and South 
China Seas sovereignty claims while maintaining both domestic and interna-
tional law-enforcement capability regionally�
China will continue to modernize its MLE agencies’ respective fleets, with pri-
mary emphasis on the consolidated CCG� However, the winding down of the ma-
jor ship-construction program of 2010–17 portends less class variation and more 
focus on future construction 
of a few (perhaps three or 
four) major classes and sever-
al minor classes, to streamline 
logistics and operations� Em-
phasis on size is giving way to 
emphasis on speed and filling capability gaps� The CCG likely will continue to grow 
numerically but is unlikely to repeat the rate of growth of the past decade—primarily 
because China by now has replaced virtually all its older, less-capable large patrol 
ships�
In the coming decade, China likely will prioritize smaller coastal-patrol craft 
and patrol combatants to continue replacement of the large fleet of small craft 
that were built largely in the 1990s and are nearing the end of their operational 
life spans� The CCG undoubtedly will focus on remedying its major remaining 
areas of weakness: severe rotary-wing limitations (only about fifty helicopter-
capable ships and few helicopters); uneven existing crew training, with seaman-
ship competency depending on former agency; and ships being produced faster 
than new crewmembers can be trained�42 To improve situational awareness, the 
CCG likely will acquire additional maritime-patrol aircraft, including helicopters 
(imported or domestic)� It will strive to strengthen planning, communications, 
and operational control�
While China will continue to focus on security enforcement of its established 
territorial waters and EEZ, the CCG will continue to operate regularly through-
out waters within the first island chain to support China’s maritime claims, as well 
as to perform enforcement and surveillance operations� Forward-basing CCG 
units on augmented features in the Paracels and Spratlys will enhance operational 
tempo and facilitate coordination with the PLAN and PAFMM�
These expanding CCG capabilities support a decisive shift in Chinese mari-
time strategy: from a three-sea-force focus on regional seas to an evolving divi-
sion of labor in which its first sea force—the PLAN—significantly increases its 
overseas missions and focus� While regional operations likely will remain the 
focus for China’s second sea force, its MLE forces centered on the CCG, the 
larger CCG ships increasingly could deploy out of area into the Pacific and Indian 
[M]assive infrastructure builds, evolutionary 
ship designs, and extensive use of commercial, 
off-the-shelf components offer China the abil-
ity to surge CCG ship construction rapidly.
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Authors’ note: The information in this article 
does not rely heavily on other finished aca-
demic papers or analyses, although several of 
these are cited for context� Instead, the great 
majority of supporting information derives 
from the authors’ compilation and original 
analysis of a vast body of available open-
source, firsthand information, almost all of 
which is posted on the Internet� The majority 
comes directly from tens of thousands of spe-
cific Internet and media sources that cannot 
be listed individually� For a full discussion of 
the documentation methodology and sources 
used herein, see the China Analysis from 





 1� This article surveys China’s principal MLE 
ships from a platform-centric perspective, 
organized by mission set� Broadly catego-
rized, MLE forces include the national-level 
China Coast Guard; the portion of China 
Marine Surveillance (CMS) and Fisheries 
Law Enforcement (FLE) vessels organized at 
the subnational level (which still exist and are 
active in the “gray zone,” but are not included 
in the CCG); Maritime Safety Administration 
(MSA) vessels, which exist outside the CCG 
even at the national level; and China Rescue 
and Salvage (CRS) vessels, which are outside 
the CCG even at the national level and generally 
play only supporting (not MLE/sovereignty-
upholding) roles� The present analysis 
spotlights the CCG as the core organizing 
entity for the majority of China’s MLE forces 
at the national level, whose consolidation 
remains a work in progress, and refers to 
them broadly as “China’s coast guard�” The 
article also addresses some of the most 
important non-CCG ships, including from 
provincial-level—but not municipal—MLE 
organizations� This ecumenical, organization-
ally flexible approach, which acknowledges 
the complexities and vicissitudes of China’s 
evolving empirical reality, has the virtue that 
the vessels themselves remain discrete and 
readily identifiable amid substantial changes 
in leadership, control, and nomenclature� 
China’s MLE organizations have been recon-
figured tremendously in recent years (and 
reforms remain ongoing), and vessels have 
shifted both among them (as well as having 
been transferred in from the PLAN) and in 
their relationship to the gray zone� The past 
decade also has witnessed multiple firsts in 
terms of China’s MLE assets operating in cer-
tain areas� MLE fleet usage, like the general 
regional situation, is fluid� Ships from all the 
agencies (including FLE, General Adminis-
tration of Customs [GAC], and MSA) have 
been observed participating in, or at least in 
the vicinity of, conflicts in the gray zone� For 
instance, while GAC vessels are absent from 
many gray-zone operations, GAC patrol craft 
can be seen in photos of the China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation Haiyang Shiyou 
(HYSY) 981 oil rig operations� Accordingly, 
our coverage includes some MLE ships and 
forces (e�g�, GAC, MSA, and CRS) that are 
not always involved in gray-zone operations, 
but conceivably could become involved in the 
future, particularly as features the Chinese 
have augmented in the South China Sea offer 
forward-deployment options� Moreover, not 
Oceans, both to increase presence and influence and to participate in joint coast 
guard exercises with other major countries, including the United States, Japan, 
South Korea, Russia, and India�
As before, designs will be adapted to suit new missions� Moreover, massive in-
frastructure builds, evolutionary ship designs, and extensive use of commercial, 
off-the-shelf components offer China the ability to surge CCG ship construction 
rapidly, if desired� When it comes to rapidity of fleet expansion and moderniza-
tion, China’s second sea force already is leading the way�
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all CCG ships are relevant to gray-zone op-
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encapsulates the value of a platform-centric 
approach: Having joined FLE in November 
2010, Zhongyang-class patrol ship Zhong Guo 
Yu Zheng 310 conducted multiple rights- 
protection missions when it was homeported 
in Guangzhou, including the 2012 Scar-
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